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The Saar and European Unity

by Sigmund Neumann

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There are a few spots on the globe where the complex forces of international politics converge and crystallize again and again in history. The Saar is one of those strategic spots. Trieste, Jerusalem, Hong Kong are others (not to mention Panmunjom and Berlin) which serve as a barometer of present tensions and events to come. Seen in this light, the Saar election of November 30, 1952 gains a significance far exceeding the results which by now have ceased to make headlines.

The tiny Saar territory, with less than 1,000 square miles in area and hardly 1,000,000 inhabitants, has been a rich prize and a bone of contention between France and Germany. Unquestionably German in race and historical traditions, its natural resources (especially its coal mines) had been incorporated into the French economy under the Versailles Treaty system as compensation for France's tremendous war losses and as part payment toward German reparations, until a plebiscite held on January 13, 1935 reunited the Saarland with the German "fatherland."

After World War II the Saar again came under French rule, and following the Moscow conference of 1947 was financially and eco-

nomically integrated with France, although final determination of its status was postponed until the signing of an eventual peace treaty. The *fait accompli* of an autonomous state was accepted by a constitutional assembly elected in October 1947.

Since that time the French have tried step by step to give finality to this separation, while the West German government, with increasing vehemence, has protested against these measures. On the eve of the 1952 election the stalemate seemed to be hopeless, and the tensions between the two rival great powers mounted. In fact, no high German official could publicly acquiesce in the Saar's surrender. Nor could any French statesman expect national support if he gave up France's claims to this crucial area, access to whose coal and iron resources has made it possible for France to balance off the economy of a constantly feared and miraculously revived Germany.

The heated election campaign, fueled from across the German border by the Ministry for All-German Affairs, undermined the slowly evolving European defense system and the carefully planned *rapprochement* between the historical foes, redoubled French doubts con-

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cerning Germany's peaceful intentions and fed reviving German nationalism with dangerous expectations. The Saar, natural bridge across the Rhine between the Western powers, was again threatening to become a potential battlefield.

Contrary to the expectations of many people, particularly in West Germany, the election resulted in a clear-cut victory for the policy of economic attachment to France and a defeat for the pro-German groups which had been barred from the ballot and therefore had called for mass abstentions or blank ballots. Yet 93 percent of the electorate went to the polls, and not even a quarter of the votes cast were invalid. The returns gave a manifest mandate to Josef Hoffmann, the Saar's minister president since 1947.

Whether this result was a victory of the stomach over the heart or simply an indication that the Saarlanders were tired of serving as a Franco-German football, it could put the debate on a new plane, provided the two great powers interpret its meaning correctly.

There is certainly no overwhelming longing among the Saar population, despite its ethnic character, to return to Germany, and this is a political fact that the Germans find it difficult to understand. If the general reaction is accurately indicated by representative press editorials in German newspapers, among them serious publications like the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* and the leading weekly *Die Zeit*, many of them simply dismissed the elections as a farce differing only in degree from terror prac-

tices in the Soviet zone of Germany. On the other hand, French commentators read into the election the final rejection of union between the Saar and Germany and an equally definite alignment with France.

A New Era?

The truth of the matter is that the Saar election was neither a fraud nor a final act, but possibly the beginning of a new era. The Saar, interdependent link of a natural geological unit across Western Europe, illustrates the need for regional integration of a rational economy and has now become the symbol of a genuine and indeed passionate enthusiasm for a united Europe. The Saarlanders' vote was a desperate appeal in favor of Europeanization; and if this should imply a sacrifice of national sovereignty, the Saarlanders are ready to make it for the sake of the larger community. This has equally been for years the choice of the former French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, himself the prototype of a new Europe, who comes from Lorraine and sponsored the ingenious European Coal and Steel Community. The election cleared the air for debating and deciding bigger issues which transcend the Saar in importance yet had been brought into the open by the election campaign.

Another and possibly equally significant consequence of the Saar decision may be its effect on the internal atmosphere of the major Western powers. This decision should reassure France, after many international setbacks in the war's aftermath; it

may make the French less intractable and more disposed to discuss the future calmly. In West Germany the election could check a rampant nationalism which had not only led to a revival of openly revisionist movements but—even more important—had begun to eat into the tissues of the controlling moderate parties.

The course of events will depend, no doubt, on the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administration. The real test, however, will fall on the Bonn and Paris governments, which will have to stand up to national elections and possible political crises in this fateful year, 1953. The accession to power of René Mayer, who won the support of the Gaullists as premier only on condition that the European Army treaty would be renegotiated and that M. Schuman would be excluded from the cabinet, has reopened the whole problem of Franco-German relations. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who had hitherto staunchly supported ratification of the European Army treaty, followed M. Mayer's lead on January 7 by asking for revisions in the treaty. M. Mayer, for his part, made it clear that he would hold up the treaty pending some agreement on the future of the Saar. This is the first time that the two questions of the Saar and of European unity have been definitely linked.

(Dr. Neumann is professor of government and social sciences at Wesleyan University, where he is also serving as chairman of the Department of History. He is the author of the *Headline Series* book, "Germany: Promise and Perils," and has contributed a study on German political systems to the forthcoming volume of Taylor Cole, *Major European Political Systems* [Knopf].)

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347

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The Prague Trials: Before and After—2

The Prague trials revealed an attempt by Communist leaders in Eastern Europe to blame economic difficulties on alleged Zionist plots and to link Zionism with the United States. A similar attempt was made on January 4 in East Germany when a former member of the East German Communist party was accused of ties with Rudolf Slansky, former general secretary of the Czech Communist party, who was executed on December 3, 1952. And on January 13 the Soviet press announced the arrest of nine "terrorist Jewish doctors" on charges that they plotted to kill top Soviet leaders on instructions from Zionist organizations and the United States and British intelligence services.

Some Western observers, watching the Prague trials, believe that they reflected a struggle for power within the Czech Communist party between Slansky and Klement Gottwald, president of Czechoslovakia. Others, however, contend that these trials, as well as reports of similar impending purges in Poland, East Germany and Russia, indicate genuine fear on the part of Communist leaders that some form of internal opposition, denounced as Zionism, inspired or at least supported by the West, may be at work within Communist ranks.

These developments, taken together with the emphasis placed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the "liberation" of Eastern Europe, have focused attention on possible alternatives to communism which might be offered by the exile groups representing Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Poland.

While these groups differ with each other as well as among themselves about their plans for the future of their countries and of Eastern Europe as a region, they have three common denominators: (1) the understandable difficulty of keeping several parties of divergent views working together in a single organization, particularly when there is as yet no immediate prospect of return to the native country to inspire cohesion; (2) the lack of financial resources, which must be sought largely in the United States; and (3) disagreement as to the character of the political and economic system which should succeed communism following liberation.

Here are brief sketches of the principal Eastern European exile organizations and their programs:

Bulgaria. To date not all Bulgarians in exile have gathered in a single organization. At the present time there are several groups which claim to defend Bulgarian interests abroad.

The Bulgarian National Committee with offices in Washington is the only exile group which has set up an organization of its own. This Committee has subcommittees in Western Europe, Greece and Turkey. The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union is the strongest party represented in the Bulgarian National Committee.

The program of the Committee stresses the following points: reinstatement of the Tirnovo constitution; abrogation of all anticonstitutional dictatorial laws and decrees issued during the period of Soviet occupation as well as after it; election of a constituent national assembly in accordance with the provisions of the constitution; reorganization of the

Army into a nonparty force entrusted with the defense of the people and the interests of the nation; social legislation on the basis of general social security; coordination of the country's industrial development with its agricultural character as a land of small holdings; and exclusion of all interference in the internal affairs of the Church.

In foreign policy the Committee favors peaceful solution of controversial problems on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and the Charter of the United Nations; abandonment of all chauvinist tendencies; and participation in the United States of Europe.

Czechoslovakia. In February 1949, on the first anniversary of the Communist coup in Prague, the Czechoslovaks established the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in Washington, headed by Dr. Peter Zenkl, former Czechoslovak vice-premier, as chairman and Dr. Jozef Lettrich, former chairman of the Slovak National Council, as his deputy. The Council was supported by representatives of six political parties: the Social Democrats, the National Socialists, the People's party, the Agrarian party, the Slovak Democratic party and the Slovak Freedom party. One of three bodies of this Council, a committee composed of leading Czechoslovak personalities, also included several prominent independents, such as Dr. Jan Papanek, former Czechoslovak delegate-in-chief to the United Nations, and Dr. Juraj Slavik, former ambassador to the United States. The Council did not recognize representatives of the prewar Small Businessmen's and National Democratic parties, and three groups remained

in bitter opposition to the council: a Czech group in London led by General Prchal, World War II opponent of Dr. Eduard Benes, and two groups of Slovak separatists led mostly by former dignitaries of the German-sponsored Slovak state of 1939-45.

Due to internal tensions between the six participating parties, the Council of Free Czechoslovakia came to an open split in January, 1951. Thirteen members of the committee, followed by others, left the Council and established a new supreme body, the National Council for a Free Czechoslovakia. Following protracted negotiations, the two groups were reunited and reorganized as the Council of Free Czechoslovakia on Independence Day, July 4, 1952. The Agrarian party remains outside the Council, although many of its most prominent members are strongly in favor of joining.

The Council's program declares that the goal of its efforts abroad "is the restoration of democratic freedoms in an independent, democratic, united and indivisible Czechoslovak republic in her pre-Munich borders." The Sudeten German question is regarded as finally settled by the Potsdam agreement, and the friendly cooperation of a democratic Germany is invited. The Council rejects the 1949 constitution and affirms its adherence to the First Republic's legal acts. Following liberation, all laws effective at that time will be immediately amended by a general act protecting all human rights, particularly with reference to the penal code. All other matters, however, especially economic affairs, will be legally reorganized only gradually, to prevent chaos. The Council disavows any attempt to impose its will on the nation, and its program emphasizes the necessity of letting the voters decide the country's political and economic structure. However, its pro-

gram states that "private and public ownership will be the foundations of our future economic system," which will be such "as to lead to a healthy national economy which, in our judgment, shall enable the population to enjoy the highest possible standard of living and full employment, while just distribution of national income shall be pursued." The Council supports the idea of a united Europe, of which Czechoslovakia would be a member.

Hungary. The activities of the Hungarian exiles who fled their country following the establishment of Communist rule have been complicated by the presence abroad of former members of the Arrowcross organization, who favored nazism, opposed the Western powers and are still doing everything they can to prevent the formation of democratic unity among the Hungarians. Moreover, the Hungarian exiles who left after the Communist victory reject the cooperation of Communist Hungarians who have fled abroad in recent years on the ground that, like the former Arrowcross supporters, the Communists oppose democracy.

The non-Communist Hungarian exiles formed the Hungarian National Council in 1948, headed by Dr. Bela Varga, a Roman Catholic priest who played an important part in Hungarian politics for many years, and former speaker of the National Assembly. Ferenc Nagy, former prime minister and a member of the Smallholders party, to which Dr. Varga also belongs, is a member of the executive committee of the Council and its expert on finances, while Tibor Eckhardt, a Smallholders party leader who left Hungary in 1940, is its expert on military problems. In several other groups, among them addition to the Smallholders party members of the Democratic People's party and the Social Democratic par-

ty, are represented in the Council.

The Council opposes both communism and national socialism. It assumes 'the responsibility' of reconstructing the country on democratic principles after liberation and believes that the successful reconstruction of the country is not possible without a basic land reform. The Hungarian exiles are not in complete agreement about relations with neighboring countries. The majority oppose the creation of a Danubian Federation unless it goes hand in hand with the creation of a United States of Europe.

Rumania. The Rumanian exiles are faced by the same problem as the Hungarian exiles, since among the *émigrés* from Rumania are many former members of the Iron Guard, a reactionary pro-Nazi group which was guilty of political murders before its leaders were expelled by the Army to Germany in 1941. Like the Hungarian exiles who want to have nothing to do with the former Arrowcross, the prodemocratic anti-Communist Rumanians refuse to have the Iron Guard participate in plans for the liberation of the country. A factor not present in the calculations of other Eastern European exile groups is a monarch, King Michael, son of King Carol. Michael, who now lives in England, is considered by most exiles a symbol of the continuity of the state, and keeps in touch with exile activities.

The Rumanian National Committee, formed in Washington in 1949 under the leadership of Nicolae Radescu, over 70, a nonparty man and a former prime minister of a coalition cabinet during the short-lived democratic period of 1944-45, broke up into two factions, one of which is headed by Radescu and the other by Visoianu. Members of the national-peasant liberal and socialist parties

(Continued on page 8)



Political Aspects of 19th Communist Party Congress

by Merle Fainsod

Dr. Fainsod, professor of government at Harvard University since 1946, is director of political studies at the Harvard Russian Research Center and author of a number of articles on Soviet government and politics.

The 19th Communist party Congress, which met in Moscow October 5-14, 1952, marked the first such gathering in more than 13 years. Long anticipated and long delayed, its sudden convocation gave rise to a flurry of speculation. At the 18th party Congress in March 1939, Stalin had thrown out a veiled hint which invited the negotiation of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Was the 19th Congress to set the stage for an equally significant announcement?

The expectation of a dramatic *démarche* in Soviet foreign policy was not fulfilled. Those who looked to the Congress for some indication that the Soviet Union was ready for a broad-scale settlement of its differences with the United States were doomed to disappointment. While Georgi Malenkov made perfunctory reference to the possibility of peaceful coexistence between capitalist and Communist states, the invective directed against American foreign policy reached a peak of unparalleled violence. The United States was portrayed in Hitler-like terms as "the principal aggressive power," bent upon the destruction of the Soviet Union. The Congress called for an intensified campaign to discredit the American "warmongers" and to isolate them in the international arena.

The main attention of the Congress was devoted to the approval of the fifth Five-Year Plan, the revision of the Communist party rules, and the reorganization of the party high command. The data released on present productive capacity and on goals for 1955 point to a continuation of

the high rates of growth which were characteristic of the Soviet economy in the pre-World War II years. If these rates of growth can be maintained and there is no comparable upward adjustment in American output, the prospect over the next decades is one of a steadily narrowing gap between American and Soviet industrial potentialities. Such a development would have a profoundly disturbing impact on the present balance of power between the Communist and non-Communist camps. Perhaps the greatest long-term challenge which American policy-makers face is that of taking measures in good time to avert such an eventuality.

Internal Party Problems

The revision of the party rules foreshadows a tightening of party discipline and an ideological arming of the party for the difficult years ahead. The discussion of the new party rules at the Congress yields some revealing insights into the worries of the party leaders about the party organization. As of October 1, 1952 the total party membership was 6,882,145, with 6,013,259 full members and 868,886 candidates. Malenkov's report to the Congress indicated that the present policy was one of restricting further expansion. He expressed considerable concern over the passive attitude of many party members who joined for careerist reasons, were indifferent to party doctrine, and neglected their assignments as agitators and propagandists. He was sharply critical of some party functionaries who had been found

guilty of corruption and the pilfering of state and collective farm property. He warned local party officials against arrogating special privileges to themselves and assuming that there were two kinds of discipline, "one for the rank and file, and the other for party leaders." He denounced the tendency of party secretaries to recruit personnel on the basis of "kinship, friendship and cronyism" and to build private empires of their own which were intended to be immune from central control. The revised party rules seek to check these "abuses." They call for a vigorous revival of "criticism from below" to reinforce control from above. The ambitious subordinate is warned that it is his duty to report on the misconduct of his superior. The party leadership promises that informers will be protected.

The new party rules also provided for a sweeping reorganization of the high command. The Politburo was replaced by a much larger body, a Presidium of 25 full members and 11 alternates. The Orgburo, which concerned itself with party organization, was abolished, and its functions were transferred to the Central Committee Secretariat. Of the 11 members and 1 alternate who made up the old Politburo, 10 continue as full members of the Presidium. One, Alexei N. Kosygin, has been demoted to alternate membership in the Presidium, a step which may be attributable to dissatisfaction with his performance as minister of light industry. The other, Andrei A. Andreyev, has been eliminated from the

Presidium, although he continues as a member of the party Central Committee. Andreyev's disgrace was foreshadowed in February 1950, when *Pravda* directed a sharp personal attack against him for supporting the *zveno*, a small-farm system of organizing collective-farm labor, in preference to the larger brigades. Although *Pravda* accused him of wishing to break up the collective farms "into small cells" his real "crime" probably consisted in failure to support the collective-farm amalgamation movement which was launched in March 1950.

The New Presidium

The new Presidium represents an effort to broaden and rationalize the Soviet top command. It merges the commanding heights of party and state administration and includes all 10 of the party secretaries and all 13 of the vice-chairmen of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers. It also contains the leaders of the trade unions and Komsomols, two representatives from the Ukraine, the head of the White Russian party, a sprinkling of regional party leaders, two high-ranking party ideologists, an old Comintern specialist and some of the Soviet Union's outstanding economic administrators. Of the 15 new personalities admitted to full membership in the Presidium, 11 are party functionaries and 4 are state administrators. Of the 11 alternates, 5 are party workers, 5 are state officials, and 1 is a party bureaucrat who has recently been shifted to government service. The most striking characteristic of the new Presidium is the absence of top military and police officials among the newly promoted members. The composition of the Presidium suggests that the party apparatus and state administration are still the road to supreme power in the Soviet system and that the party leadership

continues determined to subordinate both the armed forces and the police to party direction.

The Congress directives on Soviet foreign policy and the strategy and tactics of world communism were delivered by Stalin and Malenkov. The basic analysis was developed by Stalin in a 25,000-word pamphlet entitled "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," which was published on the eve of the Congress. In this pamphlet Stalin rejected the view that the United States would be able to organize and lead a Grand Alliance against the Soviet orbit. He argued that the economic rivalries within the so-called "capitalist camp" would become so exacerbated as to make war among the imperialist powers inevitable. Malenkov in his report to the Congress was less categorical. He confined himself to the observation that "the contradictions which today rend the imperialist camp *may* lead to war between one capitalist state and another." Despite this difference of emphasis, both agreed on the necessity of mobilizing every resource of Soviet power at home and abroad to accentuate the cleavages among capitalist states.

Plans to Split West

The Stalin-Malenkov line promises an intensification of earlier efforts to split the Western coalition. The fundamental strategy of the Kremlin is to divide and conquer. It hopes to achieve its purpose by appealing to all of the accumulated dissatisfactions which the rearmament drive and the efforts to build Western unity generate. The targets of this campaign embrace such widely divergent elements as the Bevanites in Britain, neutralists, isolationists, pacifists everywhere, extreme nationalists, workers and businessmen in depressed industries and, indeed, any group with a real or fancied grievance against

the United States. The lures which the Kremlin offers vary with the frustrations and vexations which it seeks to exploit.

It counts heavily on its ability to capitalize on the yearning for peace of war-weary people throughout the world. The "peace" movement which the Soviet leadership will continue to foster has multiple purposes. In part it represents an effort to persuade its own people that Soviet military preparations are purely defensive and that the real threat of aggression comes from outside. In part it is designed to impose checks on the rearmament of the West by planting doubts about its necessity in the face of peaceful Soviet intentions. In part its purpose is to confuse and divide non-Communist sentiment by painting American policy-makers as warmongers and imperialists who seek to impose their way of life on the rest of the world. In part it aims to win new converts to the Communist cause by identifying the Soviet Union as the apostle of peace. In part it seeks to prepare the ground for local efforts of Communists to seize power. As Stalin cautiously hinted in his pre-Congress pamphlet, "Under a certain confluence of circumstances the struggle for peace may possibly develop in one place or another into a struggle for socialism."

The Soviet effort to capture the peace cause is buttressed by more specific appeals and threats. The specter of German rearmament is used to frighten the French and others who have had occasion in the past to distrust any revival of German militarism. The members of the North Atlantic bloc are warned that their youth are destined to provide "cannon fodder" for American "monopolists" and that their readiness to make airfields available to the Americans puts them, to quote Malenkov, in a "dangerous position." The Germans

are wooed with the promise of unity, of trade with the East, of the restoration of a national army, and the intimation that a Soviet-German alliance will exclude "the possibility of new wars in Europe." The Japanese are told that the Soviet Union stands for their national independence and will help them to regain their former greatness.

Economic Warfare Program

The Congress pronouncements make clear that political warfare is to be supplemented by economic warfare. The Soviet leadership expects business recessions and economic isolationism in the United States to promote disunity and conflict among the non-Communist nations. It anticipates that economic crises in the West will aid the Soviet Union in breaking the American-sponsored ban on the shipment of strategic goods to the Soviet sphere. Meanwhile, the Kremlin proposes to press forward with the tactics pursued at the International Economic Conference in Moscow last April. It holds out the bait of a limitless Soviet market for the products of depressed industries in the West and for the raw materials of underdeveloped countries. It seeks to enlist the support of business and labor interests who see their economic salvation in expanded trade with the Soviet bloc.

Meanwhile, foreign Communists have been instructed to readjust their tactics to promote these objectives. Stalin's speech to the Congress contains the new marching orders. It calls on the Communist parties abroad to sound the tocsin of patriotism, to come forth as advocates of national independence and sovereignty and champions of bourgeois-democratic freedoms. The new course means rebuilding "national" fronts, playing down militancy and threats of insurrection and working hand in hand

with any group which is ready to repudiate American "domination." The primary purposes are to broaden the range of Communist party influence and to weaken the fabric of Western unity. As frequently happens when the party line veers sharply, not all Communist leaders have been able to make a quick adjustment. This time, as the Marty-Tillon affair in the French Communist party makes clear, the casualties are the undisciplined militants.

The Congress documents are notably reticent on future Soviet policy in Korea, Indochina, and the so-called colonial and dependent countries. Malenkov's report merely notes the expanding scale of "the national-liberation movement" in Vietnam, Burma, Malaya and the Philippines and the "growth of national resistance" in India, Iran and Egypt. Stalin's speech to the Congress is more explicit. In a frank passage he declares, "Naturally, our party cannot remain in debt to the fraternal parties, and it must in turn support them and also their people in their struggle for liberation, in their struggle for the preservation of peace. As is known, that is precisely what it does." The message of greeting to the Congress from the Korean party acknowledges "the invaluable support" of "the mighty Soviet Union" and expresses a determination "to win complete victory over the hated enemy." It appears reasonably clear that the Kremlin will continue to render assistance to its Communist outposts in the East and do its utmost to incite Middle East nationalism and unrest in the colonial areas. Whether it is also prepared to resort to direct military intervention is far less certain.

The Congress discussions provide no indication that the Kremlin is ready to unleash World War III. Despite the very considerable increase

in the military-economic potential of the Soviet Union since the end of World War II, the Kremlin still appears to appraise the hazards of total war as a threat to its own survival. It needs time to consolidate control of its satellites and to recover from the ravages of the last conflict. It places its wager for the immediate future on political maneuver and economic warfare. Its maximal hope is that it will split the Western coalition and thus open up vast new opportunities for expansion. Its minimal expectation is that it will succeed in preserving the *status quo*.

Lesson for West

Whether the tactics of the Kremlin will be effective remains to be seen. The lesson of the 19th Communist party Congress is clear. Division in the non-Communist world will be an invitation to Soviet adventure. If the Kremlin decides to risk world conflict, the weaknesses and disunity of its opponents will be the compelling force. The only alternative to total war remains an unremitting effort to strengthen the defenses of the West, to maintain the dynamics of economic expansion, to sustain standards of mass welfare, and to demonstrate the unity and vigor of the community of free nations.

READING SUGGESTIONS: J. Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Special Supplement, October 18, 1952. For documents of the 19th Communist party Congress, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*; Malenkov's report, issues of November 1, 8 and 15, 1952; Stalin's remarks at the closing session, November 1, 1952; Khrushchev's report on the new party rules, November 29, 1952; text of the fifth Five-Year Plan, September 13, 1952; the draft of the new party rules, September 6, 1952; Saburov's report on the fifth Five-Year Plan, December 6, 1952. Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948); Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (New York, Norton, 1939).

Spotlight

(Continued from page 4)

participate in both factions. Among the principal exile personalities are Charles A. Davila, former ambassador to Washington; Constantin Visoianu, former minister of foreign affairs; Grigore Gafencu, former minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to Moscow in 1940-41; and Alexandru Cretzianu, former ambassador to Turkey. The prospects of bringing the two factions together are given a 50-50 chance. King Michael supports the Visoianu group.

The two factions are in general agreement on the restoration of the 1923 constitution, which provides for parliamentary monarchy; the return

of Russian-annexed Bessarabia and Bukovina; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, with no discrimination; individual ownership of land; free cooperatives; social security and free labor unions. Rumanian exiles are unanimous in considering that a regional federation of Eastern Europe is an inadequate answer to the problems of political and economic security in that area, and favor European federation as well as close ties with the Atlantic community. The two groups disagree about the degree and speed of return to private ownership of industry.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The second of three articles on the motives and implications of the Prague trials.)

account of the building of the Chinese Communist Army and of the reasons for its success, by the United States assistant military attaché in China during 1945-48 who had first-hand experience both with communism and with Communist soldiers.

Joseph C. Grew, United States ambassador to Japan from 1931 to Pearl Harbor, devotes a considerable portion of his memoirs, *Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945* (Boston, Houghton, 2 vols., 1952, \$15) to American-Japanese relations.

These memoirs show Mr. Grew's faith in the possibility of averting war with Japan through negotiations in 1941. They are of particular interest at a time when some Foreign Service officers who served in China during World War II are being denounced for alleged mistakes of judgment which critics consider tantamount to disloyalty, and when many American commentators and spokesmen express the kind of skepticism and even defeatism about negotiations with Moscow which Mr. Grew considered unwise when expressed here before Pearl Harbor about negotiations with Tokyo.

BOOKS ON GERMANY

Recent books on Germany include *Sword and Swastika: Generals and Nazis in the Third Reich*, by Telford Taylor (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1952, \$5), an excellent, carefully documented analysis of the role of the military before and after Hitler's rise to power, by the chief of counsel for the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremberg—particularly important reading at a time when the United States is urging the rearmament of West Germany; and *Germany in Power and Eclipse: The Background of German Development*, by James Kerr Pollock and Homer Thomas (New York, Van Nostrand; 1952, \$10), a comprehensive study of Germany from earliest times to the present day, with special emphasis on the regional composition of the German state, by experts, one of whom, Dr. Pollock, has had extensive experience in postwar Germany as consultant to the United States High Commissioner in Germany.



FPA Bookshelf

BOOKS ON ASIA

Among recent books on Asia are *Hong-kong: The Island Between*, by Christopher Rand (New York, Knopf, 1952, \$3) in which a well-known contributor to the New York *Herald Tribune* and *The New Yorker* gives a fascinating picture of life in this British outpost next door to Communist China; *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951, \$7.50), a valuable collection of selected documents with critical commentaries covering the period 1921 to 1950; *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44*, translated and with an introduc-

tion by Boyd Compton (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1952, \$4.50); *The Left Wing in Japanese Politics*, by Evelyn S. Colbert (New York, International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1952, \$4.50), which analyzes left-wing developments in Japan from 1918 to 1950 and describes the wane of the Communist party after 1949; *Report from Formosa*, by H. Maclear Bate (New York, Dutton, 1952, \$3.50), an impressionistic account of life on that strategic island by the diplomatic correspondent of the British newspaper *Sunday Graphic*; and *Red China's Fighting Hordes*, by Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg (Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Company, 1952, \$3.75), a valuable

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